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Pref ace 
Many of the most critical problems in 
the relationship of the citizen to the polity 
involve the connections between domestic and 
foreign policy, the importance of the state in 
the maintenance of desirable values, the moral 
role of dissent, bargaining with competitors, 
and guarding against manifest and potential 
military threats. 
--Morton A. Kaplan, "Loyalty and 
Dissen~' in National Security 
and American Society, ed. by 
Frank N. Trager and Philip S. 
Kronenberg {Manhattan, Kansas: 
The University Press of Kansas, 
1973), p. 497. 
The stock market's ability to perform, 
at least most of the time, as a highly reliable 
leading indicator, no doubt partly reflects its 
role as a sensitive barometer of investor con-
fidence in the economy's future. 
--A 1 fred L. Ma 1 abre, Jr., "The 
Outlook," Wall Street Journal, 
May 21, l9~p. l. 
The idea for this research originated with the work of Bruce 
M. Russett and Elizabeth Hanson in Interest and Ideology: The Foreign 
Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen. Their work in attempting to 
identify businessmen's reactions {and hence, beliefs) to events during 
the Inda-China War by movements in stock prices is, as far as I have 
been able to find, unique. After discussion with Dr. John Out-
land, I undertook to determine if there is a consistent pattern 
in stock market fluctuations as a result of domestic and inter-
national affairs. Can the attitudes of American investors toward 
specific events be identified through decisions to keep or sell 
stocks? 
If one reflects for a moment, the answer would seem to be 
obvious: Certainly the stock market reflects investor attitudes 
toward and beliefs about specific events. Call~ broker on any 
given day -- or read The Wall Street Journal -- and the latest move 
will be explained, frequently in terms of domestic or international 
policies. A politician or political analyst may attempt to establish 
popularity for an individual or an event by citing the "Dow'';. e.g., 
the supposed 11 Carter11 market subsequent to the 1976 election. It 
ts almost part of American folklore·~ that the market moves· during 
April-June, 1962, were attributable to the steel price confronta-
tions. Wallace Carroll refers to stock moves in his article on the 
crisis. A respected professor of political science remarked to me 
that he recalled the market crash when President John F. Kennedy 
tested the steel industry. A widely followed investment advisor 
referred as recently as July 1979 to the "bear market supposedly 
created by Kennedy's steel industry confrontation in 1962. 111 
1stan Weinstein, .!!!!:. Professional Jape Reader, July 26, 
1979 (Hollywood, Fla. By the Author, 1979),, p. l. 
i i 
However, attribution of the 1962 crash to the steel price 
crisis is incorrect, as examination of contemporary economic 
factors later in this study will show. Therefore, J believe any 
effort such as this study must be made in full consideration of 
appropriate economic factors. It remains to be seen, then, if 
the stock market does respond to developing international and 
domestic events. If there are responses, it further remains to 
be seen whether such responses are dogmatic or sufficiently vari-
able to provide an insight into investors' perceptions toward 
and beliefs about the causative events. 
This effort is a beginning in a complex subject requiring 
a great deal more work. The goal is eventual development of a 
model enabling determination of businessmen's attitudes toward 
domestic and international events through examination of stock 
market price fluctuations. I hope that students of political sci-
ence expanding upon this starting point will have adequate resources 
to employ computer and research technology. Then, perhaps, we can 
ascertain with reasonable accuracy the stimuli to which the market 
responds, the segment of the investing population responding, and 
the reasons for the response, thereby developing true insight into 
businessmen's beliefs. Given the animus of many liberals to business, 
the prevalence of such theories as John Kenneth Galbraith's concept 
of the dominance and autonomy of giant corporations, the still pro-
i i i 
pounded "merchants of death" theory, and the theort i ca 1 conflict 
between Socialism and Marxism on the one hand and Capitalism on 
the other, it behooves us to understand the capitalist decision 
making process to the best of our abilities. If our system Is to 
be kept and improved, or if it Is to be changed, we need to under-
stand as thoroughly as possible what we are doing, and we will have 
such understanding only when we know what makes our system of 
capital formation function. 
I am indebted to the Political Science Department at the 
University of Richmond for interesting courses and hours of stimu-
lating discussions over the years, to Art Gunlicks for his assist-
ance with this work, to Mike Head and Dianne Fox of Scott and String-
fellow for making statistical information available freely and pleas-
antly, and to Ellen Tabb for transcribing poor handwriting into a 
typewritten product. Finally, I am Indebted to John Outland for his 
friendship; his outstanding courses; his thoughts on many subjects; 
and his advice, assistance, and patience all of which were indis-
pensable in the preparation of this thesis. 
iv 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
General 
Kenneth E. Boulding summarizes the role of ideology in 
economic development in The Meaning of the 20th Century: The 
Great Transition. He tells us that until the 1776 publication 
of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, economic development in the 
West took place in the absence of much in the way of conscious 
planning. Subsequently, however, development in Western Europe 
and particularly the United States was more planned than is super-
ficially apparent. "The development of the United States espec-
ially was guided throughout by a policy which was quite self-
• • • h • h l f k h . 112 conscious an ats emp asas on t e roe o mar et mec an1sm •••• 
Today the major conflicting ideology to that of the market econ-
omies is that of socialism, the primary champion of which is the 
Soviet Union. "Even within these two camps there is of course a 
great variety of ideological belief and expression. 113 
It would be impossible to detail the many works that have 
been written about competing and conflicting economic theories, 
but there can be little doubt that the effort has been extensive. 
2Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The 
Great Transition (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 173. 
31bid., p. 167. 
There can be 1ittle doubt, a1so, about the increasing interest 
of politica1 scientists in the work of economic historians (see, 
for instance, G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly 
Hills, California: Sage Pub1ication, 1978)). In attempting to 
evaluate the interaction between economic interests and politica1 
policy, however, the student of po1itical science u1timately must 
agree with Russett and Hanson: 
One major difficulty we faced stemmed 
from the high1y controversia1 nature of theories 
about the importance of economic interest in de-
termining foreign policy. Such theories, whether 
concerned with the mi1itary-industria1 comp1ex, 
neoimperialism, or other aspects, deserve careful 
evaluation. We think, in fact, that they deserve 
more careful scientifi-c evaluation than they have 
received from thei4 proponents or from those who 
would reject them. 
Russett's and Hanson's goal was to determine the attitudes 
of businessmen (more properly, various elites) toward foreign policy 
and thus to subject selected theories to detailed evaluation. One 
of the tools they employed was an examination of stock market moves 
in conjunction with se1ected events of the Vietnam War in order to 
establish businessmen's support (or Jack thereof) of those events. 
The work is important for exactly the reasons the authors felt it was 
necessary. While learned discourses have been written supporting or 
4sruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, Interest and 
Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen-Tsan 
Francisco, California: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1975), p. x. 
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attacking theories concerning the influence of economic interests 
on domestic and foreign policies, almost all of them have been 
developed deductively from certain assumptions on theories of be-
havior (see, for instance, Walter Adams, ''The Military-Industrial 
Complex and the New Industrial State" in National Security and 
American Society, ed. by Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg 
(Manhattan, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1973)). Very 
little effort has been expended to develop a means to prove or to 
disprove any of these theories through the use of empirical data 
that would establish whether the constituent elements of economic 
interests actually behave as the theories hold or have the influence 
. 
ascribed to them. The importance of a breakthrough in this area 
would be overwhelming. Imagine the effect if it could be proven 
empirically that any or all of the theorists did not have the re-
motest idea of what was actually happening in the world. 
The use by political scientists of stock market variations 
as a tool in evaluating businessmen's perceptions of events is an 
intriguing and significant approach. Many financial analysts make 
a continuing practice of attempting to determine investors' attitudes 
through examination of market action. However, political scientists 
have largely neglected this rather basic component of a market economy. 
Upon reflection, this fact is surprising, particularly when one con-
siders that "in the United States, publicly held corporations consti-
ute a much larger proportion of the total value of business enterprise 
3 
than in most other countries. 115 The stock market in this country 
certainly should provide a fertile source of data about business-
men's attitudes in a capitalist system. Laurence I. Radway points 
out that notables react to the manner in which government resolves 
issues and that they 11 ••• may serve as a testing ground116 for new 
governmental policies. Their willingness, or lack thereof, to put 
their wealth behind a policy certainly is as basic a reaction as 
could be found -- hence, the importance of the stock market as a 
testing ground. 
The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution toward 
the development of an analytical approach to determining investors' 
attitudes towards domestic and international events through investi-
gation of stock market movements. It should be noted that the atti-
tudes determined would be not of approval or disapproval of the events 
themselves but rather of their perceived effects on the nation's 
economy. It should be further noted that the development of a credible 
5James H. Lorie and Mary T. Hamilton, The Stock Market: 
Theories and Evidence (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1973), p.3. 
6Laurence I. Radway, Foreign Policy and National Defense 
(Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 122. 
4 
overall system of analysis would be a major and difficult under-
taking due to the complexities of the market. Nevertheless, 
extensive exploration should be undertaken to construct a computer 
model capable of being used for comprehensive analyses of the 
market by political scientists. There are a number of computer 
programs in use by the financial community that can provide a 
point of departure. The ultimate objective of such a project is 
to subject theories concerning the impact of business interests 
on policy to the scientific scrutiny proposed by Russett and Hanson 
and, so far, left larg·ely undone. 
Random Walk and the Efficient Market 
Central to the problem of determining investors' reactions 
to specific events through stock market analysis is the question 
of whether stock price changes are systematic or independent of 
precedr6g- events. Addressal of this question leads to the concepts 
of the random walk and the efficient market. 
The expression "random walk" probably originated in 1905 in 
Nature. Briefly, the thesis was propounded that a drunk left in an 
open field will wander in a random fashion. Accordingly, the most 
unbiased estimate of his position at any given time is the point at 
which he was left. In discussing the random walk model, Karl W. 
Deutsch points out there are elements of both determinism and proba-
bi 1 i ty in the drunkard's wandering thus permitting mathematical 
5 
projection of progress. He further points out that 
the random walk of the drunkard has more than a 
little in common with the policies of great 
nations and with the march of history on earth. 
At every step, the walk starts from a position 
given at that time; it contains an ineradicable 
random element, which may be either large or 
small in its effects; and it is subject to modi-
fication by persistent deterministic causes, 
biases, and influences, which can do much to change 
the distribution of probable outcomes but usually 
cannot make any single outcome certain ..•• Under 
these conditions individuals and governments •.. 
knowing the limitations of their powers to predict 
.•• can make provisions for possible risks which 
they can only imperfectly estimate; they can strive 
to make the risks smaller •••• 7 / 
No less do these statements apply ·to trading in the stock market 
with buying and selling the m~chanism through which risk is re-
duced. Indeed, since 1960 serious study has progressed concerning 
the applicability of the random walk model to market reactions. The 
theory here holdsthat price variations are not systematic and do 
not follow from events that have gone before but that successive 
changes are indepednent of one another. 
The corollary theory of the efficient market evolved from 
a growing acceptance by the investment community that price changes 
were in fact random. 8 This model is comprised of two main elements. 
7Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations 
{Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978, 1968), p. 96. 
8Russett and Hanson also found substantial evidence that 
stock prices moved according to the random walk model. Interest and 
Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen, p. 14'6. 
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First, at any given time a stock's price represents fairly the 
totality of knowledge that is available concerning the under-
lying company, the economy, and any other factors that logically 
would have an influence on the company's financial prospects. 
Second, any new information that is germane will be known to the 
investing public quickly, and prices will react rapidly to incor-
porate the new knowledge. In short, "an efficient market is one 
in which a large number of buyers and sellers react through a 
sensitive and efficient mechanism to cause market prices to reflect 
fully and virtually instantaneously what is knowable about the 
prospects for the companies whose securities are being traded. 11 9 
These hypotheses have been neither conclusively proven nor 
disproven. However, significant persuasive evidence of their validity 
has been amassed by their proponents, particularly in the case of the 
efficient market mode 1. It has been 11 • • • proven rigorous 1 y that 
independence of successive price changes is consistent with an effi- · 
cient market. 1110 In any event, the bases of the two models are 
sufficiently solid to use in an examination of stock market moves as 
a determinant of investor's attitudes toward the economic effects of 
external domestic and i nternat iona 1 events. By "externa 111 is meant 
those factors outside of the direct financial envelopes of publicly 
held companies whose securities are traded on stock exchanges. 
9Lorie and Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence, 
p. 97. 
10 1bid., p. 70. 
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Statement of Thesis 
The hypothesis to be examined in this paper is that the 
stock market is a credible gauge of investors• perceptions of 
--and, hence, beliefs about--significant national and international 
events. However, the market's value as an indicator of investors' 
beliefs is inhibited by the following factors: The relative magni-
tude of reactions will be more influenced by the underlying economy 
and by the degree of surprise associated with the event than by the 
importance of the event itself. Significant events which are pre-
dictable or known in advance of occurrence will have been discounted 
and, thus, will register little significant reaction. Finally, 
events threatening direct involvement of the United States in armed 
conflict will engender uniformly negative response regardless of the 
nature of the economy. 
Method 
The basic approach to be followed will be to examine stock 
price changes accompanying selected events in history. Events 
initially chosen for examination were those that, upon cursory 
examination of long term stock market charts, appeared to coincide 
with a discernible fluctuation in price pattern. They were chosen 
to represent one of three types of potential stimuli: Actions or 
decisions having direct, strong economic impact; war, or international 
8 
tension threatening war, and subsequent peace moves; and' national 
or international events engendering strong reactions, largely 
emotional, of stress or shock on the part of the American people. 
P-rice indexes then were selected from the appropriate tables, the 
direction of movement determined, and the percentage change calcu-
lated. This procedure was the starting point in a relatively long 
testing procedure. The next step was to establish whether the 
event,chosen did in fact coincide with a significant move in the 
market, again through calculations from chart data. Research then 
was conducted of selected readings and press summaries of the period 
to determine if a rationale became apparent for the event's either 
causing or failing to cause a price move. The next step was to 
select events from history that in the mind of the author could 
have prompted market reaction and to repeat the testing procedure. 
The problem here was that many of these events turned out to be 
anecdotal insofar as price moves were concerned; nothing significant 
happened, as in the case of the steel price crisis of 1962. 11 
11 Russett and Hanson also had problems with salience. Events 
which in retrospect were regarded as critical frequently were not so 
perceived at the time. Conversely, supposed major crises turned out 
to be of little or no long term significance. A key point for the 
political scientist is to develop events that are--or were--significant 
at the time in question (or to have computer programs that will develop 
the information). Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs 
of American Businessmen, p. 155. 
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Finally, the testing procedure was reversed. Charts of market 
indexes from 1928 through 1979 were reviewed to identify signi-
flcant market break points. Press summaries again were reviewed 
to establish whether the break was attributable to the economy in 
general or to a specific external event. Once again direction of 
move and percent change were established. The year 1979 was used 
as a cut-off date merely to permit subsequent use of completed 
recession patterns. 
Of the many tests conducted and events developed, a rela-
tlvely small percentage was included in this work. Those selected 
are sufficient to establish the trend that soon became apparent. 
To include more would have served only to belabor the point. 
did reinsert some events and add several new ones in response to 
interest by advisors during discussions about this project. I have 
also included a brief historical summary of the events selected to 
permit evaluation of why they did or did not produce a reaction. 
Timing is important in the determination of the effect an 
event has on the market. The choice of when to buy or sell is 
important to most investors, and it is critical to traders. 
Accordingly, emphasis should be placed on the Immediate reaction, 12 
and I have used the market reaction on the day of the event and on 
the day following. The passage of time inherently encompasses 
12 1 was interested to note that Russett and Hanson came to 
the same conclusion for the same reasons. Interest and Ideology: 
The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen, p. 156. 
10 
additional information or events that will serve to modify or 
counteract the initial perception of an event. Further, it 
must be remembered that the market basically is reacting to the 
underlying economy on a continuing basis. There are times when 
reaction to an event does not last through a day. 13 
Stock price data used are those from the New York Stock 
Exchange. White it represents but one of the security markets in 
the United States, it is" by far the most important market 
for common stocks in the world .•.. The number of issues on the 
New York Stock Exchange is substantially less than 10 percent of 
the number of publicly traded issues of stock in this country, but 
the value of stocks on the NYSE is about two-thirds of the total. 
Th . . f 1 • h" h 1. uV•. ere 1s a great concentration o va ue wit 1n t e 1st ..... 
Here, then, is where the investing elites can be found in abundance. 
Also, the overwhelming majority of empirical data on stocks is de-
rived from this exchange. 
13subsequent to preparation of my initial draft of this 
paper, I read an investment advisor's comments that summarize very 
well the interaction of news and the market. " ... invariably once 
news has been digested, the market proceeds to do exactly what it 
wanted to do before the news was announced. News is merely an excuse. 
In a. strong market, bad news causes just a fast short selloff which 
is followed by renewed strength. Yet in a bear market, bad news is 
an excuse to drive the market 100-200 points lower." Weinstein, The 
Professional Tape Reader, p. 1. 
14Lorie and Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence, 
PP· 4-s. 
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The Standard and Poor's Composite Index of 500 Stocks 
is the source of price indexes used. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average is more widely known and is popularly used to gauge 
market fluctuations. However, the Dow actually is comprised of 
but 30, albeit 30 very large, industrial companies, the values 
of which are not market weighted. The S&P 500, on the other hand, 
includes 400 industrial, 40 utility, 20 transportation, and 40 
financial companies. The index is weighted to reflect the market 
value of each company and is adjusted to reflect such changes as 
stock dividends and splits. Market values are expressed as a 
percentage of the average market value during a given base period, 
which currently is a value = 10 for the base period 1941-43. The 
S&P Composite Index, then, presents a broad representation of 
variances in the market as a whole. Such a broad index tends to 
reflect relatively accurately overall market moves, while changes 
in a particular group, as in the Dow, necessarily are filtered. 
As a case in point, many electric utility companies reflected price 
weakness in reaction to the nuclear plant accident at Three Mile 
Island. However, this weakness was limited to certain companies 
and was not an overall market indicator. It should be noted that 
the use of the S&P 500 may be controversial and that different re-
sults maybe obtained with another index such as the Dow Jones. 
Unless otherwise specified, closing index values are used 
throughout. Because of constant price fluctuations during the 
12 
course of a trading session this practice is the standard, 
accepted procedure for measuring market changes. If an event 
occurred, or if the next trading day fell, when the market was 
closed, next day values are used in each instance. This un-
fortunate but necessary procedure may dilute investor reaction 
to the extent that there is additional time for reflection and 
for subsequent, modifying events to occur. 
Finally, the effort has been made to view events and 
price changes in light of the underlying economic climate extant 
at the time. To do otherwise is to ignore the fundamental fact 
that the stock market will be reflecting what is known about the 
economy at any given moment. If I had to fault the very fine work 
of Russett and Hanson, it would be because they did not do it with 
a careful eye toward market trends of the day. For instance, their 
book contains the statement: 
An examination of the daily closing 
averages for the Dow Jones industrials indicates 
there was no major upward trend in the market 
during the period covered. The average for 
July 31, 1964, was 841; for December 31, 1970, 
it was 838. There were of course fluctuations, 
but these ranged between a low of 631 on May 26, 
1970, and a high of 995 on February 9, 1966. All 
fluctuations were within a range of 25 percent 
of the mean--not enough to cause any methodo-
1 og i ca 1 di ff i cu 1 ti es. l 5 
Statistically, the rationale may be valid. However, stock price 
changes reflect absolute values, not deviations from a statistical 
15Russett and Hanson, Interest and Ideology: The Foreign 
Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen,--P:- 158. 
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norm. Money usually is made or lost, and the magnitude of 
change determines how much. Examination of market charts for 
the period involved reveals that 1964 fell during a bull market 
that began in 1962 and established a record high in early 1966. 
A one year major bear market followed, replaced in turn by a 
major bull reaching yet a new record high in late 1968. Then 
followed a major bear lasting until 1970. Obviously, something 
traumatic and very fundamental was happening in the stock market. 
In fact, the 1969~70 debacle drove a number of investors out of 
the market and created havoc on Wall Street, resulting in a signi-
ficant reduction in the number of brokerage houses. Upheavals 
of this sort reflect a very unstable economy which must be con-
sidered in analysis, because such an economy can only affect in-
vestors• perceptions of events. The next chapter will deal with 
some of the economic factors that should be taken into considera-
tion when evaluating the meaning of market moves. 
14 
Chapter II 
Economic Factors 
General 
As has been discussed, the stock market primarily is a 
reflection of perceptions concerning the economy. How the 
market reacts to those perceptions and within what time period 
are important factors to be considered in seeking to determine 
reaction to specific events. In effect, the basic economy and, 
hence, the major market trend are providing background noise that 
influences reaction to news. Relatively insignificant news may 
serve to reinforce perceptions of a bull market and a strong 
economy and send the market soaring. During a bear market and 
poor economy the same news could have little or no effect. Mere 
examination of price moves in each case would tend to produce mis-
leading indications of investor beliefs concerning the basic event. 
In short, price moves cannot be studied in a vacuum; modifying in-
f 1 b 'd d 16 luences a so must e cons1 ere . The remainder of this chapter 
16This of course was the point Weinstein was making in his 
comments about news (see supra n. 13, p. 11). As a technical 
market analyst, he attempts to filter background noise by charting 
various indexes he has developed, a technique which also would be 
of value to the political scientist in creating an analytical model 
for market analysis. 
15 
is devoted to the more significant modifying influences that 
will be used for analysis in subsequent chapters. 17 
The price paid for the stock of a given company basic-
ally reflects a prediction of that company's future earnings, 
the degree of uncertainty inherent in the prediction, and asso-
elated risk. The investor must balance against these factors 
consideration of the return and associated risk featured in 
alternative potential investments. Affecting the decision are 
a myriad of economic considerations among which are interest 
rates, the price of gold, the stability of the dollar, inflation, 
corporate take overs, unemployment, and investment strategies. 
There are many more, and at any given time a combination of them 
will obtain. Subjective consideration will be given to applicable 
factors during analyses in the following chapters. However, pri-
mary use is made of their reflection in market trends over time 
(Figure 1), the history of gross national product (GNP) (Figure 
1), and the history of corporate earnings per share (EPS) (Figure 
2). 18 At this time, suffice it to point out that a relationship 
l7The factors discussed are not intended to cover the many 
complex forces that constitute background noise but simply to de-
tai 1 the more significant ones to be used in this study. A more 
comprehensive list can and should be incorporated into more detailed 
work in this area. Identification here serves to highlight the 
point for future efforts by the student of political science. 
18Reference of course is to earnings per share of common 
stock, a basic gauge of corporate profitability. 
16 
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among the three is readily discernible. Examination of the 
curves in the two figures readily shows a close correlation 
between market moves and gross national product and particular-
ly between market moves and earnings per share. 
There is an old adage about the securities industry that 
whenever a trade takes place, one-half of those involved fs wrong. 
While very simplistic, the statement does illustrate that there 
must be two parties to a trade, and motives obviously differ since 
one buys and the other sells. It is not feasible to interview the 
many traders to establish their reasons and the factors to which 
they are responding. 19 When there is a preponderance of action 
on either the buy or sell side, we can identify the market re-
sponse as positive or negative. The reasons usually are developed 
by market analysts, frequently after the fact, based upon evalua-
tion of applicable factors extant during the session in question. 
l9The determination of exactly which of the investing pop-
ulations is trading at any given time is beyond the scope of this 
paper and will be used only when such information is available. 
While such knowledge would be invaluable in determining beliefs of 
various elites, it is extremely difficult to gain with accuracy. 
The various populations include such disparate groups as retired 
persons, businessmen, day traders, foreigners, and institutions, 
each of which may have quite different motivations. Institutions, 
in particular, have been having increasing influence, controlling 
over two-thirds of the NYSE volume by the late 1960's. While they 
are considered "strong hands" and not expected to react emotionally, 
the magnitude of their portfolios is so great that dramatic effects 
can attend even so routine a function as portfolio adjustment. 
19 
In short, market movement provides the mathematics of change 
and subjective analysis provides the operative stimulus. A 
complication for the observer ls the fact that frequently the 
same factor wi 11 be cited for up markets and for down markets. 
Prior to government actions to support the dollar tn 1978, in-
creasing interest rates were deemed to indicate continuing infla-
tion, were bad, and caused down markets. For a period after 
government intervention, increasing rates were considered evidence 
of dedication of support for the dollar, were good, and caused up 
markets. By the summer of 1979, the rationale had reversed again. 
This kind of interaction lends further support to the random walk 
and efficient market models, which in turn support the validity 
of subsequent analysis. 
Business Recessions 
The most basic factors indicating the health of the economy 
and, therefore, affecting securities markets are business recessions 
and periods of prosperity. Despite this fact, identification of 
those two conditions is far from simple. The conventional wisdom 
holds that a decline in the inflation adjusted gross, national pro-
duct for two successive quarters constitutes the start of a reces-
sion. In actuality, recessions do not merely "happen" in this 
manner; they are formerly declared by a committee of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. This nonprofit organization is com-
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prised of economists, all of whom are prominent academicians 
from several major universities. Their committee meets at least 
every six months to determine the state of the economy through 
analysis of preceding activity. Evaluation is made of literally 
dozens of indicators among which are statistics covering employ-
ment, unemployment, factory output, retail sales, and personal in-
come, a much more complicated process than the widely held notion 
of decline in GNP. Accordingly, recessions are not so designated 
when they start but rather after (frequently long after) they al-
ready are in existence. In August 1974, Arthur Burns, then Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Board, stated that the economy did not 11 ••• 
have .•• the characteristics of a cumulative decline in business 
activity ..... In a typical business recession, al 1 or nearly all 
comprehensive indicators of economic activity move downward simul-
taneously; this is not the case presently. 1120 The worst recession 
since the 1930 1 s was then nine months old; it was not officially 
identified until early 1975. Small wonder that the investing public 
is likely to err on the conservative side in hedging against ~r.eaes-
sions. 
As we shall see, perceived recessions, whether real or 
imagined, significantly affect the market. Recessions since 1929 
are· listed in Table 1 for the purpose of establishing actual econ-
omic conditions during the period. 
20Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., "Tracking a Trend, 11 Wal 1 Street 
Journa 1, May 16, 1979, p. 48. 
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Table 1 
Business Recessions 
1929 - 1933 
1937 - 1938 
1948 - 1949 
1953 - 1954 
1957 - 1958 
1960 1961 
1969 - 1970 
1973 - 1975 
Most recessionary per~ods are readily discernible in the 
GNP curve in Figure 1. It should be noted that the 1945-46 GNP 
decline resulted because of a shift from a war to a peace economy 
and did not result from a business recession; earnings were rising. 
(Figure 2). 
Major Market Moves 
The purpose of identifying boom and bust economic periods 
is to determine if there is a rationale for major market moves, 
which in turn affect consideration of individual events. Examina-
tion· of Figures 1 and 2 already has established a correlation 
among the curves. Further review in conjunction with Table 1 re-
veals that major market trends predominantly are business recession 
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and recovery oriented. Trends traditionally anticipate busi-
ness cycles, peaking well before a decline in business activity 
begins and reaching a trough before the recovery is underway. 
When one considers that the dates of cycles are unknown until 
well after the fact, one must wonder at this clairvoyance. The 
answer of course is that investors must incorporate economic 
changes into their decisions as those changes become known 
(i.e., the efficient market hypothesis). Market prediction of 
business recessions has been so consistent that a major bear is 
considered by many to be a prime--and necessary--leading indicator. 
The last time a bear market did not perform its role as an indi-
cator was when the market crash of 1929 was accompanied by an 
almost simultaneous business slump. Since 1953, market down turns 
have preceded business recessions by from six to 13 months. As we 
shall see, Paul A. Samuelson essentially was correct in saying that 
"the stock market called nine of the last five recessions. 1121 
In order to derive specific dates of major market moves 
for use in further analysis, the S&P 500 Composite curve in 
Figure l was examined to establish break points. Price index 
21 Paul A. Samuelson, "The Uneasy Case for Stocks," Newsweek, 
June 11, 1979, p. 84. 
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charts then were consulted, specific dates and index values 
were extracted, and percentages of change were calculated. 
The results are detailed in Table 2, which establishes not only 
major bear markets and associated values but also indicates 
relative severity. Bult markets of course fill the intervening 
dates between troughs and subsequent peaks. 
Table 2 
Major Bear Markets 
Dates . Values % Change 
Top Bottom Peaks Trou9h 
September 1929 June 1932 31.92 4.40 86 
•"February 1934 March 1935 11.82 8.06 32 
~arch 1937 March 1938 18.68 8.50 54 
·~ovember 1939 Apri 1 1942 13. 79 7.47 46 
~ay 1946 June 1949 19.25 13.55 30 
µanuary 1953 September 1953 26.66 22. 71 15 
~ugust 1956 October 1957 49.74 38.98 22 
~ugust 1959 October 1960 60. 71 52.30 14 
*!December 1961 June 1962 72.64 52.32 28 
*1February 1966 October 1966 . 92. 63 73.20 21 
~ovember 1968 May 1970 108.37 69.29 36 
µanuary 1973 October 1974 120.24 62.28 48 
'"~eptember 1976 March 1978 107.83 86.90 19 
. 
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By checking Table 2 against Table 1 we see that those 
market trends indicated by an asterisk in the former were not 
harbringers of recession--as Samuelson indicated (see supra, p. 
23). Investigation shows, however, that each of those periods 
except one contained troubling economic indicators that would 
cause investors to consider that difficult times were ahead. 22 
The exception was 1939-1942, to which we shall return in Chapter 
IV. 
Conclusion 
The stock market represents an economic environment and, 
therefore, responds to a multitude of economic stimuli. The de-
gree of response establishes atmospheres of optimism or pessimism. 
These atmospheres color reactions to individual events and, there-
fore, must be considered during analysis of those reactions as 
signifying approval or disapproval of the events. The most basic 
forms of stimuli are represented by periods of business recession 
and business prosperity, and the most basic forms of associated 
atmospheres are represented by bull markets and bear markets. 
These factors may be quantified, and examination of their inter-
action shows that investors tend to anticipate periods i6f economic 
22comparison of the curves in Figures 1 and 2 readily shows 
a GNP drop associated with the 1934-1935 slump and EPS dips associated 
with 1961 and 1966. The economic difficulties of 1976-1978 should 
come readily to mind, to include the fact that the period precedes 
what has become known as the most publicized recession in history, 
even though as of this writing it still has not been declared. 
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boom and bust, producing major market trends that lead their 
related periods of business activity. Despite the many factors 
that influence prices at any given time, then, if we accept that 
major market trends are expressions of the random walk and the 
efficient market models, we can still draw correlations between 
individual events and market reaction. We must, however, examine 
objective results in conjunction with subjective analysis of the 
economic environment to maintain perspective.· 
The next step logically is to subject specific events to 
examination to determine if there are in fact market reactions 
that may be interpreted to signify approval or disapproval. In 
the next chapter, we shall begin with events that are directly 
economic in nature to provide some sort of a yardstick by which 
to gauge other types of events. 
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Chapter Ill 
Economic Events 
General 
Economic events were selected as the first group of 
specific occurrences to be analysed because of their obvious 
direct relationship to economic health. The events chosen, 
while resulting from political actions, all could have been 
expected to have a direct cause and effect relationship with 
the economy, as opposed to other types of events whose economic 
effects would be indirect (e.g., appointment of a chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board). If the stock market could be expect-
ed to react to any specific event in a manner likely to indicate 
approval or disapproval, it certainly should do so in these cases. 
A pattern of responses to events indicating that businessmen's 
attitudes in fact were reflected in those responses logically 
would indicate that further examination of other kinds of events 
could be rewarding. The absence of such response would clearly 
indicate that further analysis would be futile. Consideration 
of economic events, then, provided a sort of go-no go gauge for 
the remainder of this study. 
There are several other potential areas of interest to 
the student of political science in this category. If there is 
a pattern of response, then analysis could be used as a tool in 
testing the validity of theories about businessmen's attitudes 
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toward specific initiatives in similar areas, such as income 
redistribution, social security, and the minimum wage. Next, 
if one has had no particular familiarity with the market, this 
category provides an opportunity to gain some insight into its 
actions and reactions in a direct economic environment. Finally, 
we can gain some perspective of the magnitude of market response 
--and circumstances under which it occurs--to matters we know should 
be of significant interest within the financial community. These 
insights are necessary to make realistic appraisals of the strengths 
of response to other events which are of more indirect impact on the 
business world. 
Events 
The procedures used in the selection-testing process to 
develop events to be examined already have been detailed {see supra, 
p. 8). Events to be investigated in this chapter, together with 
calculated index moves and percentage changes, are tabulated in 
Table 3. Note that the major market trend extant when each event 
took place is indicated to aid in analysis. Trends were developed 
from data in Figure 1 and Table 2. 
want to emphasize that the events in Table 3 represent 
only a portion of those tested. Since I was not attempting to 
establish a statistically valid sample, I eliminated many calcula-
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tions that were merely reinforcing trends already determined. 
Most such calculations never even were recorded on paper; I 
dropped them as soon as their import became clear. My purpose, 
after all, in conducting a large number of tests was to deter-
mine if I could find events that produced results deviating signi-
ficantly from the trend. Accordingly, those events included in 
Table 3 are intended only to be representative of what I was dis-
covering. My primary criteria were that they be significant events 
• h. 23 h h d d b f d h 1n 1story, t at t ey cover an exten e num er o years, an t at 
they represent salient points of analysis that were emerging in my 
study. 
23The problem of saliency surfaced in the Introduction 
(i.e., an event was perceived at the time to have the importance 
that it subsequently did have). I was interested to note that 
there was a higher correlation in this chapter than in those follow-
ing between events I thought would have a significant market effect 
and those that did. This correl~tion no doubt may be attributed to 
the fact that all events had a· direct impact on the economy. 
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Table 3 
Economic Events 
Event Index % Next Day Market 
Number Date Event Move Chan9e Move - % Trend 
4/20/33 Embargo on 
gold exports .68 + 10 - s + 
2 4/28/42 Price control 
regulations 
issued .07 + 2 Trough 
3 11 /9/76 Wage price con-
t ro 1 s removed • 18 + - l 
4 1/1/S4 Excess profits 
tax expir~s . 14 + + 1 + 
Sa 4/10/62 Steel prices 
increased • 1 S - (0) - l 
Sb 4/13/62 Price increase 
rescinded .30 - (0) + (0) 
6 2/2S/64 Tax cut bill 
enacted .03 + (0) + (0) + 
7 8/29/66 Truman warns of 
recession 1. 88 2 + 2 
8 10/12/66 Administration 
bars price 
controls 2. 13 + 3 - (0) + 
9 8/JS/71 Wage/price freeze; 
gold standard 
terminated 3,07 + 3 + 1 
- * 
10 11/1/78 Dollar decline.· 
stemmed 3.70 + 4 - 1 
~";Period represented a downward correction from April 28 until November 26 
in an overall bull market. 
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Discussion 
Each event will be examined and identified with suffi-
cient history to permit judgment as to why it should have been 
of importance to the market. Analysis in light of applicable 
economic circumstances then should determine the meaning of the 
response or lack thereof. 
Before beginning analysis of events, however, we may see 
clearly in Table 3 another facet of the market that tends to dis-
tort efforts to deduce reactions to events. The :'propensity to 
sell on strength and buy on weakness is discernible from a com-
parison of first and second day changes in events 1, 3, 10, 2, and 
]. Profit taking during an upward move is apparent in the first 
three while using weakness as a buying opportunity shows in the 
last two. These two market techniques are fairly common and lend 
weight to the point that the immediate reaction to events should 
be sought. 
Events 2, 3, 4, 6 can be seen in Table 3 to have caused 
some reaction but none of any major significance. Each of these 
events was ''telegraphe~' well In advance, and, accordingly, the 
effect of each already was discounted by the time of actual occur-
rence. Congress enacted and President Roosevelt signed the basic 
legislation for war time price controls (Event 2) in January 1942. 
Therefore, when the Office of Price Administration issued imple-
menting regulations three months later, they were no surprise. 
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Although the most drastic regulations of that nature in the 
nation's history to that date, the market discounted their 
effects over time during the 1egislation process. Similarly, 
removal (Event 3) was discounted, because President Truman 
signalled his final action by prior removal of other controls. 
It is noted that initial market response was negative for impos-
ition (2) and positive for remova 1 (3). 
In the case of Event 4, businessmen supposedly would 
have welcomed the expiration of the excess profits tax with 
enthusiasm hardly represented by two one percent up days during 
a bull market. However, Congress had extended the tax for six 
months in July 1953, making the extension retroactive to June 1. 
The surprise would have been if it had not expired. 
Not only was President Kennedy's now famous tax cut 
bill (Event 6) very old news by 1964, but also the economy had 
reversed completely. When he first proposed a tax cut in June 
1962, the country still was nearing the bottom of a bear market 
(Table 2) and the biggest one day market drop since 1928 had 
occurred about a week previously. However, there never was an 
opportunity to test business reaction to the cut in the market. 
By the time a bill was enacted, it had been thoroughly and publicly 
chewed over, and a bull market was over a year old; thus, no re-
action. 
The "Kennedy steel crisis" of 1962 (Events Sa-b) often 
is credited with causing that crash of 1962, as has been discussed. 
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There certainly is reason to believe that businessmen would 
register disapproval of strong, direct government interference 
in business affairs. The crisis began late on April 10 when 
Roger Blough, Chairman of the Board, informed President Kennedy 
that U. S. Steel was raising prices, thereby setting off a gen-
eral industry increase. It ended almost exactly three days later 
when U. S. Steel rescinded its increases followed again by the 
other companies. In the interim the administration did everything 
but mug the steel industry. Feeling the increases inflationary, 
Kennedy had been enraged and had thrown the weight of government 
into his 11 jawboning. 11 Briefly, the fol lowing actions were taken: 
Four antitrust investigations conceived, a bill to roll back steel 
prices seriously considered, a bill to control steel industry wages 
and prices discussed, Department of Defense purchases diverted 
from U. S. Steel, and FBI agents dispatched in the middle of the 
I 
night to question reporters as their recoll'ections of comments by 
steel industry leaders. By winning out 11 ••• the administration 
maintained its right to look over the shoulders of capital and 
labor •••• 1124 Market reaction was nil. 25 Why? First, the incident 
did not cause the crash; the bear market already was well underway, 
having started the preceding December (Table 2). Second, there 
24wallace Carroll, 11The Steel Price Crisis of 1962, 11 in 
Readin s in American Political Behavior, ed. by Raymond E. Wolfinger 
EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 123. 
25Note that a reaction is reflected if the DOW or similar 
index (i.e., small composition and including U. S. Steel) is used. 
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apparently was no reason at the time to believe that business 
would be seriously affected beyond the effect of other economic 
factors. The consumer price index was rising and the monetary 
gold stock was at its lowest level since 1939, but GNP was con-
tlnuing to rise (Figure 1), as were earnings per share (Figure 
2). 
The two events in 1966 (Events 7 and 8) did engender 
significant reactions in the market. Neither event was antici-
pated, and each reinforced an atmosphere prevalent at the time. 
Accordingly, each represents an example of a relatively lnsigni-
ficant event causing a reaction out of proportion to its importance. 
Considering Event 7, note that February-October 1966 produced a 
major bear market (Table 2). The business outlook was gloomy 
largely due to rising Inflation and a heating up economy. The 
I 
December rise in the consumer price index (not reported until March) 
was the highest since 1950. Banks' prime interest rates and govern-
ment backed mortgage rates were rising. The Dow Jones Industrials 
on March 7 recorded the largest drop since President Kennedy's 
assassination. Cost of living and wholesale price indexes were 
rising, and the stock market decline on July 25 exceeded the March 
7 drop, with the S&P 500 Composite index falling off 2% for August. 
The Wall Street Journal reported that France had been converting 
dollars into gold for 18 months and that the United States stock of 
monetary gold was falling. In short, a bearish sentiment was per-
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vastve by August. Accordingly, when ex-President Truman warned 
that rising interest rates could lead to 11 ••• a serious de-
pression, 1126 he reinforced a trend a 1 ready we 11 underway, even 
though he was speaking as a private citizen, and a significant ' 
drop was recorded. 
Subsequently, circumstances began to develop for Event 8. 
Inflation eased, balance of payments deficits fell, the wholesale 
price index stabilized, and the Admihistration announced plans to 
help reduce interest rates. Concurrently, the economy (Figure 1) 
and earnings (Figure 2), although easing, were still on the rise, 
and indicators were pointing away from a recession. The market 
was looking for an excuse to turn and recorded a significant rise 
on September 12. When Commerce Secretary John T. Connor said in 
October that he thought there would be no imposition of controls 
on the economy, he simply reinforced a bullish view that already 
was rising in the market, and an up market occurred. 
The other three events (1, 9, and 10) were sudden, dramatic 
and unanticipated. Each of the three had, on its own merits, a 
significant impact on the market when it occurred. Each was per-
ceived as a strong action necessary to correct a serious economic 
26Facts on File (New York), XXVI, No. 1352 (1966), p. 367. 
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problem. After Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, 
he initiated a series of steps aimed at bringing the country 
out of ~he Great Depression. His embargo on gold exports 
(Event 1) followed gold anti-hoarding measures and preceded 
fixing the price of gold at $35 an ounce. Economists still 
debate the effectiveness of the steps, but at the time they were 
perceived to be bold and imaginative, which, indeed, was the plan. 
The economy under President Nixon in 1971 was similar to 
the one under President Johnson in 1966 (see Event 7). Gross 
National Product (Figure 1) and earnings (Figure 2) both were 
rising. However, so were inflation and unemployment --accompanied 
by a succession of balance of ~payment deficits and massive specu-
lation against the dollar. Without warning, on August 1~ President 
Nixon (Event 9) ordered a 90-day freeze on wages, rents, and prices; 
ended the traditional convertibility of the dollar into gold, effec-
tively devaluing the former; ordered a $4.7 billion cut In federal 
expenditures; and proposed tax ince~tives for industry. The markets 
responded with a significant rise. 
The largest one day market rise in history took place on 
November 1, 1978 (Event 10). The economy had been strong despite 
warnings of a recession, the predicted onset of which was delayed 
with each successive report of business indicators. The major econ-
omic problems facing President Carter were rising inflation and a 
dollar falling steadily against world currencies under·heavy specu-
lation. Fol lowing a long period of "benign neglect" of the 
dollar, the Administration announced suddenly a policy of 
strong support: the United States would intervene massively 
in currency markets, quintuple the sale of gold, and increase 
the federal discount rate sharply. The dollar and the stock 
market responded strongly, the former rising against world 
currencies and the latter marking its record increase. Many 
economists and world bankers felt the effort was too little, 
too late. However, generally in financial markets the event 
was considered a positive initiative to correct an uncertain 
and deteriorating situation. 
Conclusion 
The stock market will respond to single economic events 
in such a manner that investors' attitudes of approval or dis-
approval may be determined. Further, such response is not dogmatic 
(reaction to price controls appears as negative in Events 2, 3, and 
8 and positive in Event 9). There are, however, inhibiting factors 
in analysing market moves to determine attitudes. 
Overall economic conditions can create atmospheres that 
cause reactions to be stronger than causative events actually warrant, 
indeed to the extent that insignificant events may engender strong 
responses. Events creating the strongest reactions are those that 
are surprises to the public. Conversely, very significant events 
may be thoroughly discounted in the market and engender little 
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apparent reaction if they are known about well before they occur. 
Strength and duration of response may be affected by profit taking 
or bargain buying. Accordingly, there is little likelihood of a 
sustained response to a single event. Briefly, the economy, the 
amount of prior knowledge, and market strategies all will filter 
responses to events. 
Having established that there are responses to economic 
events, the next step is to determine the nature of response, if 
any, to events not of direct economic effect. In so doing, it may 
be possible to determine businessmen's attitudes in a given area, 
since the next chapter will address one category of events, i.e., 
war and peace. 
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General 
Chapter IV 
War and Peace Events 
In the hard-core ideological liter-
ature, it is often asserted that 
war is good for business, and that 
the roots of American military inter-
vention can be traced to Wall Street 
and the interests of finance capital. 
In the business community, on the 
other hand, it is commonplace that 
the efficient conduct of international 
exchange requires domestic and inter-
national economic stability, making 
capital inherently an ally of peace 
rather than war.26 
The ideological conflict enunciated by Rosen certainly is 
central to the theories representing socialist and market econ-
omies, to include variations in between. Russett and Hanson pro-
vide a comprehensive version of the ''merchants of deatW' side of 
this conflict: 11 ••• The aggregate level of demand in the entire 
capitalist economy can be maintained only by 'excessive' military 
spending, and that, in turn, requires a level of international 
tension and even active hostilities. 1127 This attitude they trans-
26steven Rosen, "Testing the Theory of the Military-lndus-
trian Complex," in Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial 
Complex, ed. by author (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 
1973), pp. 15-16. 
27Russett and Hanson, Interest and Ideology: The Foreign 
Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen, p. 12. 
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late as a simple Marxist perspective imputing 11 ••• to businessmen 
a belief that war is good and necessary for the capitalist Amer-
ican economy. 1128 Radway broadens the constituency for this side 
of the ideological argument: lllt is taken as an axiom, not only 
by Marxists but by intellectuals the world over, that the 'hard 
line' in contemporary American policy stems from the self-interest 
f f . k' l' .. 29 o a pro it-see 1ng e 1te •••• The literature on this subject 
is voluminous; yet, the debate rages on, without resolution and 
with very little scientific testing. 
It is not the primary purpose of this paper to test busi-
nessmen's beliefs, but rather to test the validity of using the 
stock market as an indicator of their beliefs. However, by concen-
trating only on the issues of peace and war in the chapter, a re-
flection of investors• attitudes should appear if the market does 
in fact function in accordance with the random walk and efficient 
market models. Again, the intent is not to develop the actual econ-
omic effects of war and peace but rather to develop a measure of 
investors' perceptions about those economic effects. Certainly, such 
an effort--and this is but a beginning--is necessary if the ideo-
logical conflict identified by Rosen (see supra, p. 39) is to be 
29Laurence I. Radway, Foreign Policy and National Defense, 
p. 128. 
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tested. As Hanson and Russett have stated, 
Any effort to understand the causes 
of contemporary American military activity abroad 
must address itself to the perceptions and pre-
ferences of American investors; analysts of every 
ideological persuasion must face the evidence of 
these questions openly.30 
Certainly, if the "merchants of death" or related philosophies 
have any validity, a reflection of investor~1 perceptions should 
indicate that international tension, or even war, is considered 
desirable. 
Events for this chapter are displayed in Table 4. They 
were selected using the same testing procedures described pre-
viously. Again it should be noted that many more occurrences were 
tested than were finally chosen. I used the same rationale in 
choosing that I used before: I retained a cross-section of events 
I considered representative of trends that developed during test-
ing, and I discarded additional events the pattern of which merely 
reinforced those already selected. I specifically wanted to include 
however, those events that signalled the direct involvement of the 
U. S. military forces in each of the last three wars as well as the 
events that terminated those wars. Also, in a few cases, I have in-
eluded several incidents generally considered to be part of the same 
30Betty C. Hanson and Bruce M. Russett, "Testing Some Econ-
omic Interpretations of American Intervention: Korea, Inda-China, 
and the Stock Market," in Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial 
Complex, p. 23. 
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crisis. I took this approach, because I felt there was value in 
determining if there were significant differences in reactions to 
successive events during a crisis. Note at the outset that in no 
case did any of the events .coincide with the start of a market 
trend (Tables 2 and 4 and Figure 1); hence,none caused either a 
bull or a bear market. 
Table 4 
War and Peace Events 
Event Index % Next :Day Market 
No. Date Event 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
9/29/38 Munich pact 
91 1/39 Poland invaded 
6/22/40 France surrenders 
6/22/41 Russia attacked 
12/ 7/41 Pearl Harbor 
attacked 
51 7/45 German surrender 
8/ 6/45 Hiroshima bomb 
anriouhced ... ~ .. " .: 
8/ 9/45 Nagasaki bomb 
dropped 
9/ 2/45 Japanese surrender 
Move· Change Move·- % Trend 
.42 
. 12 
.07 
• 16 
• 41 
+ 4 + 3 
+ + 2 
+ + 
+ 2 (0) 
4 3 
------- flat ---------
.04 + (0) 
.24 + 2 flat 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
signed ------- flat --------- + 
1 Oa 
lOb 
6/25/50 South Korea 
attacked 
6/27/50 U.S. force 
authorized 
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1.03 
.2 
5 2 + 
+ + 
Table 4 - War and Peace Events - continued 
Event Index % Next Day Market 
No. Date Event Move Change Move 
- % Trend 
11 7/26/53 Korean fighting 
ceases . 16 + (0) 
12a 4/17/61 Bay of Pigs 
invasion . 31 + (0) (0) + 
12b 4/20/61 Bay of Pigs fa i 1 s . 01 + (0) (0) + 
13a 8113/61 East German border 
sealed .33 - (0) (0) + 
13b 8/15/61 Berl In Wal 1 begun • 17 - (0) + (0) + 
13c 8/18/61 Kennedy orders 
troops to Berl In • 18 + (0) + (0) + 
13d 8/20/61 U.S. troops arrive 
Berlin . 14 + (0) + (0) + 
13e 8/22/61 Berl in foreign 
travel re!tricted .01 + (0) (0) + 
13f 8/23/61 USSR accuses allies .46 - (0) {O) + 
14a 10/22/62 Cuban crisis -
quarantine 1.47 - 3 + 3 + 
14b 10/28/62 Cuban crisis -
resolution 1. 18 + 2 + . 1 + 
15a 8/ 4/64 N.Vietnam attacks 
U.S. destroyer 1. 04 + (0) + 
15b 8/ 7/64 Tonkin Gulf reso-
lution passed .52 + (0) (0) + 
16 1/30/68 Tet offensive .65 - (0) + (o) + 
17a 8/ 3/68 USSR Czech conf ron-
tat ion .22 + (0) + (0) + 
17b 8/10/68 USSR announces com-
bined manuvers 1.PO + 1 + (0) + 
17c 8/20/68 Czechoslovakia·--
-Jn~aded .04 - (0) (0) + 
18 1/27/73 Paris peace agree-
ment .44 - (0) (0) 
19a 5/12/75 Mayag;uez seized .08 + (0) + + 
19b 5/14/75 Maya9uez crew 
rescued .69 + (0) + 
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Peace Events 
Review of Table 4 quickly shows that peace events asso-
ciated with the ending of open hostilities were of no particular 
significance insofar as market response is concerned on the days 
during which they occurred. For example, and using the two most 
extreme cases, in spite of the spontaneous, public jubilation that 
accompanied the formal signing of the German and Japanese surrenders 
ending World War II (Events 6 and 9), stock market reaction was nil. 
During the period of both surrenders, the economy was sound, and a 
bull market was in full sway (Table 2 and Figure I). More signi-
ficantly, an allied victory had become increasingly apparent during 
the preceding year, and knowledge of surrender ceremonies was known 
to the public well in advance of the actual signing. Similarly, 
the formal ending of the Korean and Vietnam Wars (Events ti and 18) 
elicited no significant response, certainly nothing not in keeping 
with the bear markets already extant in each case (Table 2 and 
Figure 1). 31 Also in each case, the formal agreement on the termina-
tion of hostilities followed a protracted period of negotiations, 
and the final acts largely were non~events, at least from the stand-
point of the stock market. In any case, there is little doubt that 
the four incidents reviewed were major events in history, but their 
3lEvent 11 illustrates yet another difficulty in measuring 
the meaning of responses in the absence of subjective analysis. 
When an event has been known (or iven rumored) well in advance of 
its occurrence, frequently investors will "sell on news11 when the 
event actually happens, thereby actually producing a negative re-
action to an event that in reality is perceived as good for business. 
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effects already had been discounted In financial markets by the 
time they took place. A better picture of the market's reactions 
to peace, as opposed to reaction to one event, is seen in Figure 
1: the market continued its rise after Events 6 and 9, began a 
rise Immediately after Event 11, and dropped after Event 18. In 
the latter case, however, the market was reacting to indicators 
showing that an overheated "guns and butter" economy was leading 
into the worst recession since 1930. 
Events 7 and 8, unlike the previous four, were developments 
that Jed to peace. The dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was 
announced to the American public on August 6, 194~ followed by the 
. 
announcement of the Nagasaki bomb three days later. The first, 
not just a surprise but unique at that time, elicited little response. 
The second, while no longer unique but sti11 a surprise, elicited a 
strong, positive reaction. The second bomb injected a new factor 
into contemporary thought in that it indicated, although incorrectly, 
that the United States possessed not one but an arsenal of atomic 
horrors. As such, the Nagasaki bomb probably engendered hopes of 
shortening the war that were missing in the first explosion. 
Signing of the Munich pact (Event 1) .in 1938 by Germany, 
Great Britain, Frace, and Italy was not a peace treaty and ended no 
hostilities. Intended as a war avoidance pact, it ceded a large part 
of Czechoslovakia to Germany and is widely regarded today as an act 
of appeasement actually contributing to World War II. However, the 
"peace in our time" promised by Great Britain's Prime Minister at 
the conclusion of the conference came as a welcome surprise to the 
American people. Review of Figures and 2 shows that this country 
was still pulling itself out of the Great Depression and the market 
was on the rise. It is highly possible, therefore, that the event 
reinforced market optimism, engendering an unduly high, positive 
response out of keeping with the strength of actual perceptions. 
The "merchants of death" thesis does not necessarily lead 
to a corollary that capitalists dislike peace after an actual period 
of hostilities. In any~ent, there is ·nothing in the reactions to 
the incidents examined to indicate a predisposition for war. 
Quite the contrary. Predictable events were discounted In the 
market prior to occurrence; bold, surprise events registered strong 
reactions; and all reactions were in keeping with their existing 
major market trends. 
War Events 
The German invasion of Poland (Event 2) officially began 
World War I I. However, there was no way that the investing public 
could have been aware of that fact at the time. The market ostensibly 
showed a mild positive move, but it is entirely possible that the 
reaction was more in response to the underlying bull market and re-
covering economy than to the invasion. Americans, still feeling close 
to the Great Depression, were very sensitive to the state of the 
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economy, and as the EPS and GNP curves in Figures 1 and 2 show, 
the economy had troughed and was in a strong upward trend. The 
United States was strongly isolationist at the time, and the 
Congress alrepdy had passed several neutrality acts. There was 
a prevalent feeling that the affairs of Europe should not affect 
the United States. While 11 ••• the majority of American public 
opinion was in favor of the Allies, there was not much inclina-
tion to side with them actively. Experiences after World War I 
had a sobering effect, and too, It was widely believed that Allied 
victory was assured anyway. 11 32 Additionally, the invasion, while 
unwelcome, was no real surprise; Germany had been building pressure 
overtly against Poland since the preceding March. 
The German attack on Russia (Event 4) was a different sit-
uation. There was no warning of the attack, and there was no bull 
market to encourage price increases. Further, the United States 
did not feel itself as removed from European affairs as before. 
The market response to Event 4 was a fairly strong up move. I can 
not rationalize this move except through my personal belief that it 
represented approval of dual perceptions: the threat to the United 
States was lessened by a split between the two former allies, and 
Nazism and Communism conceivabl~ could render one another ineffective. 
3211world War 11, 11 Encyclopedia Americana, 1949, XXIX, 556p. 
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The French surrender to the Germans in 1940 (Event 3) 
was not a peace event to the United States, but a war event. 
In retrospect, it should have been a major act disabusing the 
rather wistful U.S. feeling that the Allies would prevail. The 
evacuation of British forces from the continent in early June 
and the fall of France certainly neither lessened the chances of 
American involvement nor indicated an early end to the war. The 
market, again ostensibly, gave a minor positive response. How-
ever, the political and military collapse of France increasingly 
had been assured for well over a month, and the surrender ceremony 
merely confirmed what was already a fact. "War is bullish" advo-
cates ,should note that during the latter part of May and early 
June; while the fate of France was being determined, the market 
dropped 3.13 or 26%. 
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor without warning (Event 5) 
in 1941, it was a profound, unexpected shock to the American people. 
There now was no question that the United States was in the war. 
The Japanese declaration of war was December 7, and the U.S. followed 
suit the next day. The collapsing ~arket, clearly identifiable in 
Table 4, indicates investor response. In fact, this point begs 
examination of the 1939 - 1942 bear market, the only one in this 
study that does not seem to follow economic indicators. There was 
some inflation, but, as Figures 1 and 2 show, the economy was strongly 
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upward during the period. However, as the upper curve in Figure 
shows, investors obviously were showing a very bearish reaction, 
a reaction for which I have no explanation except for pessimism 
about the increasing likelihood of war and the early military set-
backs once the U.S. was in the war. It was not until the Allies 
stemmed, and then began to reverse, Axis successes in North Africa 
and the P.acific in 1942 that a bull market began. In any event, 
the entire period is an exception to the rule that the stock market 
tracks economic indicators. 
Although preceeded by terrorism, border Incidents, sub-
version and propaganda barrages, the overt North Korean attack on 
the Republic of Korea (Event 10) was an unwelcome surprise. The 
likelihood of American involvement was perceived to be strong from 
the outset in light of officially expressed concern prior to the 
attack. In spite of a strongly recovering economy and a bull market 
(Figures 1 and 2), market response was extremely negative to the 
attack (lOa) and continued to register negative reactions for the 
succeeding two days, to include the day President Truman authorized 
the use of U.S. military forces against the North Koreans {Event lOb). 
The Cuban missile crisis (Event 14) began for the United 
States on October 16, 1962, when President Kennedy first learned of 
the implacing of Russian missiles and nuclear weapons in Cuba. Be-
tween then and the time of Kennedy's televised address to the nation, 
on October 22, the American people became well informed concerning 
the situation as it existed. However, the president's address still 
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came as a shock: The United States was imposing a naval and air 
quarantine on the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba, and 
U.S. forces were making 11 all the preparations for further 
military action. 1133 Now, from the President of the United States, 
the full ramifications of the crisis were made clear, and the 
world knew that the nuclear superpowers were engaged in a direct, 
military confrontation for the first time, bringing 11 the 
world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind. 1134 
A strong economy and a bull market did not prevent a strong, nega-
tive initial reaction. Subsequently, after recovering, the market 
emulated the rest of the world by doing nothing while the crisis 
developed, ending the period about where It began. Then, on October 
28, President Kennedy announced the USSR decision to dismantle and 
withdraw its offensive weapons from Cuba. (Event 14b). Market 
response was sharp and positive. 
The last crisis eliciting a discernible response, albeit 
slight, was the Tonkin Gulf incident (Event 15) when there was a 
slight drop in a strong bull market. Perhaps the reason for the 
relatively mildly disapproving reaction to the North Vietnamese PT 
boat attacks on U.S. destroyers was that American involvement in 
33Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970,P. 33. 
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Vietnam had been growing steadily since 1962. U.S. facilities 
in Vietnam had been attacked previously, frequently with result-
ing casualties. There was no way that the public could forsee 
that either this event or the subsequent passage of the Tonkin 
Gulf resolution (Event l5b) would develop into the morass of 
the Vitenam War with its massive deployment of U.S. land, sea, 
and air forces. No particular significance was attached to an 
attack by a country with essentially no Navy against U.S. de-
stroyers nor to subsequent retaliatory air strikes. It is 
interesting to note that while it cannot be directly attributed 
to increasing involvement, the market dipped 4% between November 20 
and December 16, 1964, as growing military intervention became 
apparent. Of course, it could have been but a "technical cor-
rection" during a bull market. 
The Tet offensive (Event 16) could have been expected to 
engender strong disapproval in. financial markets. It was totally 
unexpected and created widespread dismay in the United States. 
Although now recognized as an overwhelming military disaster for 
the North Vietnamese, at the time, largely because of exploitation 
by Senator Eugene McCarthy and others, it was widely perceived as 
a decisive Communist victory. During the night of January 30, 1968, 
Communist forces launched their most coordinated offensive of the 
war. While suffering heavy casualties, they attacked major cities, 
provincal capitals, a number of district towns, and U.S. and Re-
public of Vietnam military installations. John Spanier summed up 
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the reaction: "It was the beginning of the end for the United 
States in Vietnam, as American opinion, already beset by doubts 
about the wisdom and costs of the war, became increasingly dis-
i llusioneJ.1134 Market reaction was nil. Apparently the opera-
tive words in Spanier's summation were 11 beginning 11 and 11 increas-
ingly. 11 Lorie and Hamilton, in their analysis of the effects 
of the Vietnam War, point out that 11 ••• dissatisfaction did not 
seem to be as acute and violent prior to 1969 as it did in 1969 
and 1970, 1135 when, of course, severe economic strains were evident. 
In any event, at the time of Tet, the event was not perceived as 
having strong economic consequences. The market was willing to 
wait and see. 
The same "wait and see11 attitude is reflected in all of 
the remaining events (12, 13, 17, and 19). While important inci-
dents in the affairs of nations, they were not considered necessar-
ily to lead to war or to have significant ramifications for finan-
cial markets. 
34John Spanier, Games Nations t!2Y= Analyzing International 
Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 185. 
35Lorie and Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evi-
dence, p. 9. 
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Irving L. Janis tel ls us that 11 the Kennedy administra-
tion's Bay of Pigs decision ranks among the worst fiascoes ever 
perpetrated by a res pons i b 1 e government1•136" (Event 12). After 
a brigade of Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, every-
thing went wrong, and within three days all of its members either 
were killed or captured. While undoubtedly it was a fiasco, at 
the time the American people had no reason either to know that the 
United States was backing the scheme with military and CIA resources 
or to believe that there were economic consequences for the U.S. 
The invasion was unexpected, but It did not have perceived rele-
vancy. to those involved in the stock market. 
~ 
Several incidents associated with the "Berlin Wall" crisis 
(Event 16) were examined: East German sealing of the border to East 
German travel (Event 13a), beginning work on building the wall it-
self (Event 13b), President Kennedy's ordering U.S. troops to travel 
by autobahn from the_West Zone of Germany to Berlin· (Event 13c), 
Vice President Johnson's greeting American troops upon their arrival in 
Berlin (Event 13d), East Germany's restricting foreign travel to but 
one Berlin crossing point (Event 13e), and the Soviet Union's accusing 
the three Western powers of abusing their rights of air access to 
Berlin (Event 13f). There were other incidents leading up to those 
36 1rving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthlnk (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1972), p. 14. -
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listed and more following, all of which were contributors to a 
high level of international tension. These six were selected 
to reflect the manner in which the market reacts to events in 
a crisis which does not appear directly to entail major armed 
conflict by American forces. The relevancy was there and the 
potential for war was there, but obviously investors did not 
believe there would be a military clash. Public statements on 
all sides carefully avoided threatening armed conflict, and simi-
lar incidents had occurred before (e.g., the Berlin air lift). 
The market felt reasonably secure in waiting and seeing. 37 
The incidents surrounding the 1968 invasion of Czecho-
slovakia (Event 17) also had a potential for u.s.~ussR military 
confrontation, but such a possibility was remote and would have 
entailed a Russian invasion of Western Europe. Further, the 
Soviets had invaded a satellite, Hungary, before without causing 
37Russett and Hanson also found evidence of the "wait and 
se~' attitude during periods of international tension directly in-
volving the United States. As they discovered, once the situation 
became clear and uncertainties removed, investor decisions on trad-
ing would be based upon perceptions of the effect of the· clarified 
situation on corporate profits. These findings, I feel, support the 
conclusion that stock market respons~ is not systematic in favoring 
international tension. See Russett and Hanson, Interest and ldeo-
~: The Foreign_ Policy Beliefsof American Businessmen, pj):-1'4'6=" 
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a confrontation with the United States. Again several events 
representing the crisis were selected from among the many, 
leading up to and including final, open conflict. The three 
selected were the confrontation in Prague between representatives 
of the Dubcek regime and the Warsaw Pact (Event 17a); the Moscow 
manuvers adjacent to Czechoslovakia (Event 17b); and the sub-
sequent invasion of that country by elements of the Soviet, East 
German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies (Event 17c). As 
before, the purpose of this sequential analysis was to portray 
a pattern, if any, of market response to significant events during 
the crisis. 
~ 
The Mayaguez (Event 19) incident did involve direct combat 
action by U.S. military forces. A Cambodian gunboat seized the 
United States ship and its crew of 39 in international waters in 
the Gulf of Siam 60 miles off of the Cambodian coast. Two days 
later 200 Marines supported by carrier-based air strikes on Cam-
bodian gunboats and an air base landed on Tang Island and boarded 
the now empty vessel. The crew subsequently was rescued at sea 
from a Thai fishing boat. Each of these events came as a surprise 
to the public. However, the U.S. military operation, a raid, was· 
so swift that by the time it was made public it was practically 
over. President Ford through his press secretary even offered dur-
ing the initial announcement of the raid to cease operations if the 
crew were released. There also was a precedent, at least for the 
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seizure, in the North Korean capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo. 
No one was concerned that Cambodia would attack the United 
States, and administration handling of the incident together 
with its short duration avoided raising the specter of "another 
Vietnam." In an event, there was no market respone to either 
the seizure or the raid. 
Conclusions 
The stock market reacts to individual events of inter-
national tension, permitting a judgment as to Investor~! beliefs 
concerning the economic effects of war and peace. However, re-
actions may be filtered by an atmosphere associated with attitudes 
toward the underlying market trend, by market strategies, and by 
the degree of surprise associated with the event. Therefore, 
price fluctuations must be considered in light of prevalent econ-
omic conditions, particularly in making judgments as to the strength 
of reactions. 
Formal peace events involving the United States (i.e., 
the si~ning of treaties) tend to be known well in advance, are 
thoroughly discounted in the market, and engender no reaction 
significant enough to gauge investors• attitudes other than to 
indicate that they are not considered undersirable. Incidents 
leading to peace or to avoidance of involvement of the United 
States in a major war elicit strong, favorable responses, parti-
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cularly if unexpected. Alternatively, incidents either involving 
the United States directly in significant, armed conflict, or 
seriously threatening to do so, engender strong, negative responses. 
In this respect stock market responses to acts of war involving the 
U.S., either real or perceived, tend to be systematic in that such 
responses uniformly are strong and negative. Other events of inter-
nat lonal tension not perceived as significantly affecting the U.S. 
produce no significant reaction. Rather, the stock market continues 
to register fluctuations in keeping with its recent history and the 
major market trend extant. Accordingly, as regards this work, the 
"merchants of death" theory ts without validity. Capitalists as 
represented by American investors do not .regard war and international 
tension as beneficial for the economy and, therefore, do not find 
them to be desirable. 
Having determined that the stock market exhibits efficient 
market characteristics for events of international tension as it 
does for economic events, it remains to be seen if the market can be 
used as a barometer of businessmen's attitudes toward other occur-
rences that do not have such obvious, high impact potential. Accord-
ingly, responses to lower potential events will be considered in the 
next chapter. 
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General 
Chapter V 
Miscellaneous Events 
If it happens once In the stock market, 
It's a trend; if ft happens twice, It's 
a tradition. 
---Saying 
Events directly affecting the economy understandably may 
evoke strong reactions of pessimism or optimism from the invest-
ing public. We have seen that war and the threat of war, equally 
understandably, evoke strong ~egative reactions; which may be 
quite divorced from actual economic conditions and market trends. 
But what of traumatic and/or highly significant events that, 
while of great impact on contemporary society, do not threaten war 
or have discernible economic ramifications? The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine such significant, often emotional, events in 
an effort to determine if businessmen's reactions to them may be 
Identified from their stock market decisions to hold, buy, or sell. 
The random walk and efficient market models permit such determina-
tion if there is a pattern of price change fluctuations responding 
to selected events. 
Events 
Events selected for examination are in Table 5. I used 
the same select-test-retain-discard process that I have de-
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Table 5 
Mi see 11 aneous Events 
Event Index % Next Day Market 
No. Date Event Move Chan9e Move - % Trend 
4/12/45 Roosevelt dies .01 - (0) + 1 + 
2 9/24/55 Eisenhower 
heart attack 3.02 - 7 + 2 + 
3 6/ 8/56 Eisenhower 
ileitis • 85 - 2 + 1 + 
4 10/ 4/57 Sputnik launched • 35 1 
5 1/31/58 Explorer I 
launched • 02 + (0) + 1 + 
6 11/22/63 Kennedy assasi-
nated 2.01 - 3 + 4 + 
7 3/31/68 Johnson declines 
to run 2.28 + 3 + (0) + 
Sa 7/15/71 Nixon announces 
China visit . 06 + (0) - (0) + 
Sb 2/21/72 Nixon arrives 
Peking . 01 + (0) + (0) + 
9a 9/16/73 OPEC price in-
crease .29 - (0) - (0) 
9b 10/16/73 Arab-Israeli War .38 + (0) - {O) 
9c 10/17/73 Oil price/tax 
hike .22 - (0) - (0) 
9d 10/18/73 Arab oil embargo .04 flat + (0) 
9e 11/25/73 Embargo counter-
measures 2.86 - 3 
10 8/ 8174 Nixon resigna-
ti on 1. 08 
11 a 11/15/77 ·Begin invites 
Sadat to Israel • 61 + (0) - (0) 
11 b 11/17/77 Sadat accepts .29 - (0) + (0) 
11 c 11 /26/77 Sadat arrives • 08 - (0) + (0) 
12a 8/11 /78 Camp David Summit .30 + (0) + (0) + 
announced 
12b 91 8/78 Talks begin 1. 37 + 1 + (0) + 
12c 9/17/78 Documents signed • 91 - (0) - (0) + 
12d 9/18/78 Accord made public Same - 17th on Sunday + 
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scribed in previous chapters. My Intent deliberately was not 
to concentrate on a category of incidents or even on incidents 
similar in nature. Rather, I specifically wanted to examine a 
variety of events to determine if there was a pattern of market 
reactions, thereby validating judgments as to investors' attitudes. 
I found myself being led by curiosity in my search more in this 
chapter than in the others, however. Having calculated one re-
sponse to the death of a "sitting" President, I found that I 
wanted to examine similar episodes (to inc.lude death scares) in 
order to establish whether the single instance was an aberration 
or symptomatic. (A glance at Events 1, 2, 3, and 6 in Table 5 
readily reveals why I felt these reactions were worth retaining 
as a group.) then found myself mystified as to th~ signifi-
cance of the market response pattern that developed. The next 
logical step seemed to be to explore the possibility that the 
pattern would be repeated for an unexpected incident of a serving 
President's simply leaving office under crisis circumstances be-
fore his generally anticipated departure. This search, in turn, 
led me to test President Nixon's resignation and President Johnson's 
decision not to run for another term. 
Although I was not seeking events with strong economic 
overtones, some (e.g., the Arab oil embargo) obviously have such 
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connotations. My basic intent was to use a representative 
sampling of events considered "block busters" by contemporary 
political scientists. 
Presidential Health 
Under the heading of "Presidential Health" are those 
events {1, 2, 3, and 6) either involving the death of a Presi-
dent in office or threatening the death or disability of such a 
President. It is interesting to note the ~imilarity of market 
reactions to President Eisenhower's illnesses (Events 2 and 3) 
and President Kennedy's assassination (Event 6), and the startling 
contrast between those and Pr~sident Roosevelt's death (Event 1). 
There is no reference material bearing specifically on this 
phenomonon of which I am aware. Accordingly, my analysis must be 
subjective in a search for an explanation. 
Franklin O. Roosevelt (Event 1) was controversial through-
out his career. There were few neutrals concerning him; most 
people either idolized him or detested him. 38 
38vermont Royster, retired editor of The Wall Street Journal 
and still a frequent contributor, was a journalist during the terms 
of the last eight Presidents. Accordingly, I feel his views are 
germane: "Of the eight, FDR was certainly the most popular in terms 
of votes. He was also among the most excoriated of Presidents. 
Though in a voting minority, those ~ho hated him were legion and 
they made no secret of their dislike for the man as both person and 
Presid~nt. They were vociferous, even vicious; the mere mention of 
his name would throw many of them into near apoplexy. 11 See Vermont 
Royster, "Thinking Things Over, 11 Wal 1 Street Journal, Sep. q, 1979, 
p. 26. 
61 
• 
The only man to be elected to the Presidency more than 
twice, he was in his thirteenth year and fourth term in office 
when he died, quickly and unexpectedly,,of a cerebral hemorrhage 
while on vacation in Warm Springs, Georgia. At the time, the 
country was still at war, and the Vice President, Harry S. 
Truman, was little known nationally and had been in office for 
just over three months. Furthermore, he 11 ••• looked and talked 
like ••• a failed haberdasher." Merle Miller summed up the 
reaction: 11 ••• I was feeling ••• frightened. remember saying 
••. , 'My God, now we're left with Harry Truman. Are we in 
trouble? 11139 
From insights gained thus far into the financial market's 
reaction to news, all the elements would seem to have been in 
place for a strong reaction. There actually was little time for 
reaction the day of his death, as he was striken about 1:00 P.M. 
and died at 3:35 the same afternoon. However, review of market 
activity for the two-day period shows that there was no discernible 
interruption in the steady, upward trend that characterized the 
entire year. The question is, "Why?" must rely on conjecture 
to develop the answer, but feel that it is important to do so In 
light of reactions to Events 2, 3, and 6. 
39Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of 
Harry 2_. Truman (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1974), 
p. 206. 
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I believe the basic answer is that the people of the 
United States were superbly confident and close to bein~ un-
shakeable in April 1945. A massive American military machine 
was bringing World War II to an end. The Great Depression was 
well into the past, and the economy was strong with corporate 
earnings having not yet peaked (Figure 2). The stock market 
{Figure 1, Table 2) was in the midst of a four-year upturn. 
Americans perceived their country to be in fact the strongest 
nation on earth, militarily and economically. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Events 2 and 3) was relatively 
popular as a President, a father figure to many and a war hero 
40 to most. The nation had been at peace since shortly after his 
taking office. His Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, was relatively 
well known, although not well liked and vaguely not trusted by 
many. 41 In light of the reaction to Roosevelt's death these facts 
do not set the stage for the stock market's reaction to each of 
Eisenhower's sudden and unexpected illnesses. Despite a bull 
market (Table 2 and Figure 1), the response in each case was a 
very strong, downward movement, at least on the first day. Later 
in the first day and on the second in each case, bargain buying 
4011 1t seems that personal attractiveness is an asset in 
getting elected .... Eisenhower had it .... 11 See Royster, Wall 
Street Journa 1. 
4111 1ntroverted, cold, aloof, his winding path ... was 
strewn with enemies, political and personal." See Ibid. 
63 
into the sharply dropping prices took place. Reaction to his 
heart attack (Event 2) was the more severe of the two. How-
ever, the figures do not give a comprehensive picture of true 
response to Event 3. He was stricken with ileitis on June 8, 
1956, and emergency surgery was performed at 2:59 A.M. the next 
morning, a Saturday. By Monday, the next market day, medical 
reports were favorable. Nevertheless, after two days for in-
vestors to digest the news, the price index closed down 2%, and 
that did not tell the true story, since the market 11 ••• regained 
about 60% of lost ground later June 8 and June 11. 1142 Again, 
the question is, 11 Why? 11 Again, I believe the answer lies in the 
confidence level of the American people. 
The basic uncertainty in both Events 2 and 3 was, of 
course, reflected in the questions of survival, death, or inca-
pacitation. The circumstances of Eisenhower's heart attack were 
further complicated by constitutional questions not associated 
with Events 1, 3, and 6 in that, in the event of his incapacita-
tion, procedures had not been established either for formal deter-
mination of incapacity or for delegation of Presidential powers. 
Another uncertainty that did not become a consideration in Events 
1 and 6 was the question of whether the incumbent would be able 
to seek a second term, and, of course, that point was of greater 
42Facts £!.!.File, XVI, 815, 192. 
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significance in Event 3 than in Event 2, due to the proximity 
of the election. However, these issues do not seem sufficient 
in themselves to explain an extreme reaction that ran contrary 
to the major market trend. 
Economically, the country had seen two recessions since 
World War II, one of them during Eisenhower's tenure as President 
(Table 1), and was about to slide into another in August 1957. 
However, it was in the international arena that the greatest 
uncertainty--and fear--lay. The United States had adopted a 
strategy of deterrence under which 11 ••• the United States decided 
to try to deter or dissuade hostile governments from attacking in 
the first place ••• (and) ••• the weapons most likely to accomplish 
such a goal seemed to be ••. nuclear bombs. 1143 However, the Soviet 
Union had detonated a nuclear weapon in 1949 and had 11 ••• achieved 
the capacity to infli~t terrible damage on the United States in 
any nuclear exchange. 1144 In short, the American monopoly in atomic 
weapons had been broken, and the world had entered the era of bi-
poliarity in military capabilities with the U. S. at the one pole 
and the U.S.S.R. at the other. John Spanier tells us: 11 ln a bipolar 
system, given the sense of insecurity, fear and suspicion that the 
43 Radway, Foreign Policy and National Defense, p. 36. 
44Robert E. Osgood, 11The Reappraisal of Limited War, 11 in 
National Security and American Society, p. 345. 
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great powers feel, .•. the avoidance of crisis is particularly 
difficult.•.45 It was the aura of impending crisis and the 
terrible knowledge of the possible catastrophic consequences of 
confrontation that made uncertainty and concern a ip.revailing 
condition. "Both superpowers drew the same conclusion from 
their common fate of being, in Robert Oppenheimer's words, 
'two scorpions in a bottle.' Churchill called this the 'balance 
of terror' and said survival would be the twin brother of anni-
hilation •••• In 1955, Presideni Eisenhower proclaimed that there 
was 'no alternative to peace 11146 In short, I believe that the 
stock market's reaction to the possible death or incapacition 
of the President of the United.States was an emotional reaction 
based upon fear of the unknown. An economic justification cer-
tainly is difficult to fathom. 
believe that the same rationale explains the market's 
strong negative reaction to the assassination of President 
d {E 6) 47 K d 1 h P 'd . 48 Kenne y vent • enne y was popu ar enoug as a res1 ent. 
45spanier, Games Nations fJ2.y_, p. 145. 
47As a matter of interest, it should be noted that the 
reaction, while strong, was less than half of the response to 
Eisenhower's heart attack. 
4811Jack Kennedy rubbed a lot of people the wrong way in 
his brief time; Camelot was a c.r;eation of martyrdom." See Royster, 
Wa 11 Street Journa 1. 
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His Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, was well known and considered 
capable, although he was not particularly loved. 49 The economy 
had seen difficult times during 1962, setting three adverse records 
for activity up to that time: Monetary gold stocks reached their 
lowest levels since 1939 in May; the market registered Its greatest 
one day drop since October 28, 1928 on May 28; and the Consumer 
Price Index registered a record increase in March. However, at the 
time of the assassination, economic conditions were In an upturn 
accompanied by a steadily rising market. (Figures 1 and 2). 
It must be recognized that conditions surrounding the assas-
sination were considerably more chaotic than those associated with 
the Issuance of medical bulletins by Eisenhower's doctors. Radio 
and television bulletins reflected the initial crisi~ atmosphere. 50 
Representatives of the news media were accompanying the Kennedy 
motorcade in Dallas and coverage, accordingly, was instantaneous, 
contributing to the prevailing confusion generated by uncertainit~es 
over the following: The number of assassins; conspiracy rumors; 
' 
and initial location and condition, not only of the President, but 
also of several other members of his party, to include the Vice 
President. 
49111 Affection 1 wasn't exactly the word for Lyndon Johnson, 
who never shook off the image of a political wheeler-dealer.~' See 
Ibid. 
~
SOThe crisis aspect of constitutional succession was resolved 
quickly. Kennedy was shot at 12:30 P.M. CST, and Johnson was sworn 
In at 2:39 P.M. 
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!' 
Presidential Withdrawals 
In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the race 
for the Democratic nomination for President (Event 7). Stock 
market reaction was evidenced by an obvious dse.-.'ln August 1974, 
President Richard Nixon announced that he would resign from office, 
the first U.S. President to do so (Event 10). The reaction was a 
slight drop, but it was not wholly out of line with normal fluctua-
tions in the continuing bear market that existed at the time. 
(Table 2, Figure 1). 
Neither event was entirely unexpected. Political pressure 
on President Johnson had been building from challengers threatening 
to deny him the nomination. His announcement was made on Sunday, 
' 
so there was ample time for reflection prior to the market's opening 
the next day. Further, the magnitude of the response is not as 
great as it might appear. A new bull market (Table 2, Figure 1) 
had begun on March 5 in reaction to announcement of economic indi-
cators indicating a cooling of the economy, so while a favorable 
response was recorded, it was not contrary to the market trend. 
Since the identity of the next President could not be known, there 
was no reason to believe that the improving economy would worsen. 
Further, the transition, almost a year away, would be a traditional 
and orderly process. The fact that there was a strong positive re-
sponse undoubtedly reflects a dissatisfaction with Johnson, upon 
whom had been placed much of the blame both for the Vietnam War and 
for the resulting economic quagmire during his administration. 
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In Nixon's case, it had been apparent for sometime that 
he was increasingly unable to govern effectively because of his 
preoccupation with the Watergate issue. His administration had 
been embroiled in Watergate for over a year and a half, and by 
August 1978 assistants to Nixon were perceived to be controlling 
the reins of government. When he finally announced his resigna-
tion, there was nothing to alter an already pessimistic market. 
The Space War 
The first visible signs of the "space war" between the 
United States and Soviet Union began with the coded b.eeplng of 
an 184 pound earth satellite. The first evidence to the world 
that the Russians had launched Sputnik was the radio inter-
ception of those beeps (Event 4). The event was traumatic to 
the United States whose technical superiority was to serve as 
a counterbalance to Soviet superiority in tanks and manpower. 
Now, America's belief in its technological superiority was shaken. 
More importantly, it suddenly realized that it was vulnerable to 
direct nuclear attack as never before. 11 ••• The launching of 
the Sputnik satellite in 1957 ••• revealed the full extent of the 
challenge which the United States had to meet from Sov~ct techno-
logy. For the first time in its history the United States felt 
itself in danger of physical attack •••. 11 51 
5lMichael Howard, "The Classical Strategists," in National 
Security and American Society, p. 289. 
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President Eisenhower's admi n i st rat ion, stung and .. 
embarrassed, responded to Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2, which was 
launched November 3, 1957, by permitting Wernher von Braun to 
proceed with a satillite under the U.S. Army program. In fact~ 
"That dramatic example of Soviet technology (Sputnik) pro-
vided a new sense of urgency with regard to all aspects of 
advanced military technology ••. 1152 Almost three months after 
Sputnik 2, the American Explorer 1 was fired into orbit (Event 
5). Of course, preparation for, and execution of, the launch was 
conducted with full publicity; there was no surprise, only pleasure 
that "the bird flew. 11 
Each of these events engendered strong American emotional 
responses, both of national pride and of perceived susceptibility 
to what would become known as "nuclear blackmai l. 11 
Event 4 was unexpected, Event 5 was not. Market reaction 
to Sputnik (Event 4) was a mild drop, not out of keeping with the 
existing bear market (Table 2). Obviously, while creating some 
uncertainity and concern, Sputnik was not perceived as signifying 
an immediate threat of war. Market reaction to Explorer (Event 5) 
52Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much~ Enough: 
Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1971), p. 184 
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was nil. Neither event, then, was perceived to have strong econ-
omic ramifications.53 
Nixon's China Visit 
"President Nixon announced to an astonished American public 
July 15 that he would visit Peking before May 1972 ••• 'to seek 
normalization of relations between the two countries .••. 11154 There 
was reason for astonishment. No Chinese government had ever re-
celved any American President. 
No American government has ever extended recognition to the 
Communist Chinese government. Further, in American strategy "the 
purpose of containment ... {had been) ..• to contain Russia and, 
after late 1949, Communist China as well. 1155 Of course, the United 
States had 11 negotiated formally or informally with Peking when-
ever Washington felt its interests were involved ••• , 11 56 but for 
an American President to announ'ce that he would visit China was 
53while neither event was perceived to have strong economic 
ramifications, we know now that they did. John Kennedy made an Issue 
out of the "missile gap" during his run for the Presidency. After he 
took office,"··· the number of strategic bombers and missiles was 
but It to a level three or four· times the size of the Soviet Union's 
"See Roadway, Foreign Policy and National Defense, pp. 38-39. 
54Facts £!}. Fl le, XXXI, 541. 
55Spanier, Games Nations~: Analyzing International 
Po 1 it i cs, p. 356. 
56 1btd. 
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abruptly to alter a United States policy that had existed since 
the Communists seized power on the mainland. For the stated 
purpose of that visit to be "normalization of relations" was to 
Imply a completely revised equation in U.S. relations not only 
with China, but by implication also with the Sovt~t Union. In-
vestors apparently saw no economic consequences fn the visit. 
There was no market response either to the announcement (Event 
Ba) or to the actual visit (Event 8b) despite an underlying bull 
market during each. 
I believe the reason for no market reaction in spite of 
the visit's unexpected and dramatic nature was that businessmen 
were unwilling to invest then in the possibility that signtficant 
' 
changes vis-_!-vis China actually would develop. After so many years 
of virulent anti-Americanism from Corrununtst China, a cautious wait 
and see approach appeared to be the wise choice. Significantly, 
however, there was not a negative response. 
The Arab Qll Embargo 
Events 9a-c include the 1973 Arab oil embargo and selected 
closely related Incidents. I felt the embargo should be examined in 
light of what we how know were its severe economic effects. I In-
eluded the other events as I did in the preceding chapter in order 
to develop a representative pattern of response during the course 
of a crisis, and, I included the October War because it was an 
integral part of the crisis. It was not in my opinion a war 
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event threatening direct involvement of the United States. 
"At the time of the Six Day War in 1967, it would have been 
difficult for the United States to become a direct participant 
in the conflict. And yet in 1967 there was a good deal more 
going for such an action than exists today (the October War). 11 57 
No single event in recent history has had the effect on 
the American economy as did the Arab oil embargo of 1973. The 
effective result of the embargo was a world-wide shortage of oil 
and an increase in its price from $2.70 to $10.00 a barrel. 
Already galloping inflation combined with economic reaction to 
the embargo led to the worst U.S. recession since the early 1930's 
(Table 1). It should be noted that the shortage of oil and the 
quadrupling of its price both resulted not from basic laws of 
supply and demand but from Arab political acts constituting an 
international power play. 
Tension between the Arabs and the Israelis built steadily 
during 1973, culminating in October in war between Israel and 
Egypt, soon joined by Syria and other Arab states (Event 9b). 
Throughout, the Arab oil producers brought increasing pressure to 
bear against the Western industrialized nations to influence their 
policies toward Israel. Saudi Arabia, considered a friend of the 
57Lucius 0. Battle, "Peace - lnshal lah, 11 Foreign Pol icy, 
14 (Spring 1974), 114. 
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U.S., Issued several warnings linking oil supplies and Middle 
East policies. In April, Saudi Arabia publicly tied the flow 
of oil to United States policy toward Israel. The Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, citing inflation, announced 
higher oi 1 prices for Western countries on ·september 16 (Event 
9a). On October 16, the October War erupted (Event 9b). On 
October 17, 11 nations of the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries agreed to a coordinated program to control 
both oil production and export to force a change ln U.S. Middle 
East policies. Concurrently, the six largest Persian Gulf oil 
producers announced a 17% increase on taxes paid by Western oil 
companies operating tn their countries {Event 9c). On October 
18, Saudi Arabia announced that she would reduce oil production 
by 10% Immediately and would cut all shipments to the U. S. if 
America continued to supply arms to Israel. Abu Dhabi joined 
with an announcement stopping oil shipments to the U.S. and any 
other country supporting Israel. These were the first steps in 
the embargo (Event 9d). On November 25, President Nixon on 
national television ordered countermeasures to offset a pre-
dicted 17% shortfal 1 in winter fuel supplies. (Event 9c). In-
cluded were a reduction in supplies to retailers, a 50 mile per 
hour speed limit, a reduction in jet fuel supplies, and the alloca-
tion of heating oil. 
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None of these incidents qualified as a surprise, except 
possibly the actual timing of the war. The crisis in the Middle 
East had been building for an extended period. The U.S. Senate 
gave some warning of President Nixon's order by passing a man-
datory fuel allocation system bill on November 14 and by passing 
an energy bill that was enabling legislation for the executive 
order on November 19. The details of the President's message 
were not known in advance. 
Stock market reaction to the embargo and its associated 
Arab events was negligible (Events 9a-d). The response to Event 
9e, the countermeasures, was strong and down. The market already 
had dropped 9% between January and Event 9a, largely Jn response 
I 
to steadily dropping economic indicators and rising inflation. 
However, probably the real reason there was little reaction to the 
Arab initiatives is that investors were not getting the message. 
They obviously did not perceive a threat of U.S. involvement in 
war, and it is also probable that they did not perceive that the 
Arabs would carry through with their oil weapon. Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company has gone on record as saying that, 11 ••• there was 
every expectation that the shortages created by the (oil) embargo 
would end within a period .of several months •••• 1158 
Between October 18 and Event 9e, the market had dropped 
another 12%, reacting to continuing poor economic indicators and 
5BRichard F. Janssen, "The Outlook," Wall Street Journal, 
July 2, 1979, P· 1. 
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the now obvious economic impact of the shortage of oil. Accord-
ingly, President Nixon's countermeasures reinforced pessimism 
that already was building in the investing community. More impor-
tantly, I feel that the strong, negative reaction can be attributed 
to the fact that, since the President of the United States was 
addressing the nation, investors now were getting the message. 59 
Sadat-Begin Summits 
If President Nixon's visit to China was astonishing, 
Egyptian President Anwar. Sadat's visit to Israeli Prime Minister 
Menahem Begin begs description (Events lla-c). The centuries old 
hatred of Arab for Jew and Jew for Arab is we 11 known but imper-
fectly understood by alien cultures. Perhaps an Arab can give it 
some expression: "Two cultures, historically rooted and obsessed, 
are pitted against one another and they seem most willing to sacri-
fit:e the future and the present at the alter of the past. 11 "Israel· 
has become a fixation, an obsession, and a proxy for all the problems 
that plague Arab society. 1160 It literally was inconceivable that 
the leader of the Arab nation that most bore the brunt of wars with 
Israel would hint that he would visit and even more inconceivable 
that he would be invited. Nevertheless these events occurred. It 
59There was also discernible, negative reactions to the 
bills passed by the Senate on November 14 and 19. 
102. 
6
°Fouad Ajami, "Middle East Ghosts," Foreign Pol icy, pp. 96, 
76 
would be difficult to overestimate the ramifications for sta-
bility in the Middle East, world peace, and resolution of the 
oil. crisis with its associated impact on Western democracies 
if this first visit by an Arab leader to Israel since its estab-
lishment as a nation Jn 1948 were to result in peace. 
The Sadat-Begin meeting failed to produce lasting re-
sults. Subsequently, the White House announced on August 11, 
1978, that a summit meeting between the two moderated by President 
Carter would be held at Camp David, Maryland (Event 12a) to resolve 
the Middle East deadlock. The meeting began September 8 (Event 12b) 
and terminated September 17 (Event 12c) with a treaty signing cere-
~ 
many at the White House. Since all discussions at Camp David were 
held under conditions of an effective news blackout, details of 
the treaty were not known until President Carter addressed a joint 
session of Congress on September 18 (Event 12d). Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat had agreed to the framework for a peace 
treaty and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip issues and 
to conclude a peace treaty within tnree months. This step toward 
peace was very much in keeping with objectives of the United States, 
because,, as Lucius Battle has said, 11 ••• Increasingly American 
interests necessitate a settlement •••• We cannot face isolation 
with the lsraelis ••.. 1161 
61 Battle, Foreign Policy, 113. 
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Considering both Events 11 and 12, the elements were 
again in place for a strong market reaction: Surprise, parti-
cularly for Events lla and 12d; highly significant incidents; 
and, the obvious potential for significant effects on the 
economy. Nevertheless, there was no discernible stock market 
reaction. It is tempting to explain the lack of reaction in 
terms of market trends. Event 11 occurred when the market was 
approaching the bottom of a bear (Table 2). However, Event 12 
took place in conjunction with an upward moving market. The 
only logical explanation that can be offered is that after so 
many years of Middle East turmoil and failed expectations, In-
vestors were cynical that peace actually would be forthcoming. 
Given the prevalent attitudes of the PLO and radical Arab states, 
their conservatism ls understandable. 62 
Conclusions 
The stock market reacts to miscellaneous events in accord-
ance with the random walk and efficient market models. Accordingly, 
investors' perceptions as to whether such events are good or bad 
62 1 was in a brokerage house during both of these events, and 
some sort of market reaction was expected. The only explanation that 
analysts could provide was the one given here. So far as I know, no 
other answer has been forthcoming since. 
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for the economy may be deduced. However, international events 
perceived not to have a reasonable probability of success do 
I 
not cause the market to deviate significantly from its con-
temporary pattern in spite of the fact that such events might 
be of extreme potential Importance in the affairs of nations. 
Investors' reactions to these events apparently reflect a judg-
ment concerning probability of success and a willingness to wait 
for other clarifying events. In such cases market reaction may 
not be used to determine attitudes of approval or disapproval. 
The stock market reacts most strongly to surprise events 
and particularly to those creating a feeling of uncertainty. 
The magnitude of reaction is proportional to the degree of uncer-
tainty and/or perceived threat induced in investors toward their 
total environment, even though the event In itself seems to portend 
no significant economic consequences. In this regard, market re-
sponses since World War II to the death, even the potential death, 
of a President in office have tended to become almost systematic 
in that such responses have been both very strong and negative. 
The tentative conclusions to which I am led from this fact is 
that Americans tend to regard a President in office as a father 
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figure in their inRermost beings and when that image is threat-
ened by sudden destruction, the reaction is one of unreasoning 
. . f 1 • • 63 emotions o tota 1nsecur1ty. 
No such extreme, systematic response is associated with 
a President's simply removing himself from office, whether the 
removal is traumatic, as in President Nixon's resignation, or 
in accordance with routine procedures, as in President Johnson's 
decision not to run. In these cases, the market reacted to each 
on its individual merits. Market response may be filtered by an 
emotional atmosphere, however, as in the case of President John-
son's decision. Americans apparently do not feel threatened by 
the orderly transfer of power, even if done quickly in a unique 
manner. 
63 1t would be interesting to evaluate the results of a 
study made to determine which of the investing populations did 
the selling and which did the bargain buying in incidents asso-
ciated with the death of a President. Such a study would be 
extremely difficult, particularly at this late date. The last 
.time of which I am aware that an analysis of trading populations 
was made, the NYSE did it under pressure from Treasury Secretary 
Dillon to determine the sellers in the May 28, 1962 crash. How-
ever, I suggest that results would be illuminating if a student 
of political science were prepared to conduct such a study at 
the time any future crisis occurs. 
Bo 
Perceived relevancy filters market response. Further, 
' 
Investors seem to assign a relatively low probability factor 
to the worst case in regard to international events with the 
potential for significant effects on the economy, as in the case 
of the oil .embargo. Reaction to such crises follows a pattern 
of erosion over time both as the crisis develops and as its 
effects actually begin to register on economic indicators. 
However, formal, decisive actions directed at the crisis by 
either the Executive or the Legislative branches of government 
do engender discernible response. This fact Is particularly 
apparent when the President addresses the nation. The conclusion 
to be drawn ts that investorsr perceptions toward a continuing 
crisis may be reinforced or altered on a one-time basis by Presi-
dential or Congressional actions, particularly the former, and 
even if the actions do not alter the basic nature of the crisis. 
Subsequent perceptions of the crisis will be on the anticipated 
merits of each action as it unfolds. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions 
It is not my intent to reiterate previous conclusions, 
but I feel a summary of salient points is warranted. To begin, 
daily fluctuations in the stock market may be used as one tool 
to assist the student of polltical science in determining in-
vestors' attitudes toward the economic aspects of international 
and domestic affairs. Such knowledge would in turn assist in 
I 
putting many theories of national and international relations 
through a scientific testing process. However, developing a 
model for the requisite analysis of market moves will be diffi-
cult and complex. The mere quantification of magnitude and 
direction of daily movements will not suffice, particularly if 
the daily indicator is not out of line with the indicator for any 
other given day. All of the many factors that influence market 
activity and filter its results must be an integral part of the 
analysis. Obviously, what is required even to begin is a great 
deal of work with the NYSE and w·ith financial analysts. There 
is sufficient validity to the random walk and efficient market 
models for the work to be undertaken, even though those models 
do indicate that the market will discount many significant events 
in advance and will refuse to react to others pending development 
of new information. 
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The strongest investors' reactions developed in this 
study were associated with issues of war and peace and with 
issues of the death of a President. Responses to these two 
issues tended to be almost systematic and in the case of the 
Presidency _largely emotional. Strong reactions opposed to war 
developed as did strong negative reactions of what can best be 
described as uncertainty associated with the death, or threatened 
death, of a President. Unfavorable reactions also developed when 
Americans felt that their security from military attack was threat-
ened. The strength of all responses grew as the amount of associ-
ated surprise increased and was directly proportional to the amount 
of uncertainty or fear of the unknown that prevailed. The con-
clusion to which I am drawn by these facts is that American in-
vestors really do not consider this a safe world in which to live, 
militarily or economically. They really are basically uncertain 
and insecure and tend to react emotionally when their basic senses 
of security, military or economic, are threatened. 
Obviously there is much comprehensive effort remaining to 
make the stock market a truly useful analytical tool to the poli-
tical scientist. This has been a beginning, and I hope that some-
one with the necessary resources will undertake to carry on. 
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